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ABSTRACT
This paper sets the scene for a JEPP special issue entitled ‘Re-engaging Grand
Theory: European Integration in the Twenty-first Century.’ The special issue
engages three theories – neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and
postfunctionalism – that have their intellectual roots squarely in the study of
European integration. The purpose of this article is to describe the genesis of
each school and outline what is distinctive about its approach in relation to
four landmark events of the past decade: the Eurocrisis, the migration crisis,
Brexit, and illiberalism.
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This article evaluates three theories – neofunctionalism, intergovernmental-
ism, postfunctionalism – that were designed with European integration in
mind. Each theory was formulated prior to the great recession. How, we
ask, do these theories explain the genesis, the course, and the outcome of
four episodes of European (dis)integration that we have witnessed since
2008: the Eurocrisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and illiberalism?1
This is an unusual approach because it asks us to consider the contributions
of each theory in its own terms. We neither treat these theories as mutually
exclusive, nor do we mould them in a composite super-theory. Rather, our
purpose is to discuss them as partial attempts to shed light on a multi-
faceted phenomenon. Each has something to offer in explaining the course
of European integration, but they do so from different standpoints with
different puzzles in mind.
This approach has the virtue of recognizing that neofunctionalism, intergo-
vernmentalism, and postfunctionalism are flexible bodies of thought that
resist decisive falsification. They are perhaps better described as schools
than grand theories. Each school engages researchers who work on a wide
variety of topics, but who share some affinities in the questions they ask
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and the steps they take in answering them. Each school identifies key political
actors, suggests paths of inquiry, and situates European integration within a
broader literature.
In the sections that follow, we describe the genesis of each school and
outline what is distinctive about its approach before turning to its contri-
bution in explaining the Eurocrisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and illiberalism.
Comparing the schools
We begin by comparing the basic characteristics of each school. What litera-
ture is each approach rooted in? What question or puzzle does each bring to
the fore? What is the explanatory focus? Who are the chief actors? How does
each approach conceive causality?
Neofunctionalism is unusually eclectic in its intellectual roots (Schmitter
2005: 256ff). It is deeply influenced by two theories – pluralism and function-
alism – that gained traction in the immediate post-World War Two decades.
From democratic pluralism and the work of Truman and Dahl, neofunctional-
ism developed the idea that government could be disaggregated into its
component group actors. Instead of making assumptions about the interests
of states, as classical realists had done, neofunctionalists conceptualize the
state as an arena in which societal actors operate to realize their interests.
So rather than explaining international politics as a game among states, neo-
functionalists consider international relations as the interplay of societal
actors. This has released neofunctionalists from the assumption that inter-
national relations is driven by the desire for state survival or economic gain.
If groups within or among states believe that supranational institutions are
more promising than national institutions in achieving their interests, then
regional integration will result (Haas 1958/2004: xiv).
Neofunctionalism takes on the functionalist idea that international
cooperation is a response to scale economies in the provision of public
goods. Whereas functionalists argue that the only feasible way to bypass
state sovereignty is by transferring specific state functions to specialized inter-
national agencies, neofunctionalists emphasize the potential for deeper and
broader governance at the regional level. Whether this will lead to some
kind of federal polity is unknown. Neofunctionalists have been more inter-
ested in the direction of regional integration than its outcome.
Neofunctionalists identify a series of mutually reinforcing processes that
lead to further integration. These include spillover among policies that are
autonomous only in the short term; increasing reliance on non-state actors
to implement such policies; a shift in citizen attachment towards suprana-
tional institutions; and as a result of each of these, more intensive exploitation
of the benefits of trade and, more broadly, of interdependence. Neofunction-
alists pay detailed attention to how regional integration in one policy induces
integration in other policies, either by opening up new possibilities for
cooperation, or more likely, by generating unanticipated problems that
trigger further integration. They are particularly attentive to the dynamic
effects that arise from supranational activism. Supranational actors engineer
policy spillover as policy entrepreneurs by brokering agreements and by co-
opting national bureaucrats or interest group leaders. Both non-state actors
and national elites learn from their past successes and failures, and this
alters their preferences as well as their tactics. As integration proceeds and
supranational actors get stronger, this dynamic can take a life of its own.
Neofunctionalism expects the path of integration to be jagged. Crises may
delay or even retard integration, but the guiding assumption is that, over time,
policy spillover and supranational activism will produce an upward trend. The
term, European integration, itself reflects the neofunctionalist premise that we
are witnessing a process that has a direction.
Hence, from a neofunctionalist perspective, the causal path is characterized
by path dependence.2 The timing and sequence of prior integration matters
because it progressively narrows the range of options. The micro-foundation
for this is bounded rationality in which political actors typically have incom-
plete information and short time horizons. Prior integration generates unfore-
seen crises that make the status quo untenable, but sunk costs make it difficult
to reverse course.
Intergovernmentalists, by contrast, view European integration from the
standpoint of national states searching for mutually advantageous bargains.
Whereas neofunctionalism explains integration as the outcome of
cooperation and competition among societal actors, intergovernmentalism
explains integration as the outcome of cooperation and competition
among national governments.
One stream of intergovernmentalism views regional integration as a
response to shifts in the balance of power. In the case of European integration,
the key development is the post-war US-Soviet duopoly which relegated Euro-
pean states to mid-range powers. The founding states had each failed the
essential test of legitimacy, defending their populations from foreign occu-
pation. However, all this did not abolish deeply rooted nations, nor did it extin-
guish the zero-sum nature of geopolitics within Europe itself. This underpins
the idea that integration stands in contradiction to national diversity and,
when these logics collide, national differences are likely to prevail. Integration
therefore has its core in economics, and it leaves state sovereignty untouched
or it strengthens the national state (Milward 1992: 2–3). As a consequence,
integration comes to a standstill once it affects high politics (Hoffmann
1966: 868).
A more recent stream of intergovernmentalism extends this by applying
international political economy to member state bargaining. It rejects the
idea that state interests are zero-sum in favor of the idea that economic
interdependence produces gains for states that cooperate. Like neofunction-
alism, liberal intergovernmentalism conceives international institutions as a
response to interdependence. Following Keohane’s functionalist theory of
the formation of international regimes, liberal intergovernmentalism argues
that states may rationally conclude agreements for institutional cooperation.
However, unlike neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism explains
international cooperation as the exclusive product of national leaders, and
behind these, functional interests. Liberal intergovernmentalism combines a
liberal theory of domestic preference formation with an institutionalist
account of intergovernmental bargaining in which states are instrumental
and driven chiefly by economic interests.
The decision process breaks down in three steps: the domestic formation of
national preferences; intergovernmental bargaining; and the creation of Euro-
pean institutions to secure agreements. In the first step, government prefer-
ences are shaped by powerful domestic groups, chiefly firms, and interest
aggregation is funneled through national channels. The interests that drive
decisions on European integration are primarily economic and issue-specific,
and aggregation is pluralistic in that government preferences are chiefly the
result of interest group, rather than party-political, pressures (Moravcsik 1998).
Asymmetrical interdependence among states shapes intergovernmental
bargains. States least in need of an agreement are best positioned to deter-
mine the terms of the bargain, especially when the decision rule is unanimity.
Unlike neofunctionalism, which highlights unequal access to information,
intergovernmentalism posits a flat informational environment making it feas-
ible for governments to decide without the help of non-state policy entrepre-
neurs (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 71).
Liberal intergovernmentalism conceives institutional outcomes as func-
tional responses to cooperation problems. It anticipates that states will del-
egate or pool just enough authority to ensure that national governments
will find it in their interest to comply with the deal. The typical outcome,
then, is a lowest common denominator, but the level of integration that
this entails will vary with the nature of the cooperation problem.
Whereas neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism view European inte-
gration as an efficiency improving process in which economic actors seek
gains, postfunctionalism emphasizes the disruptive potential of a clash
between functional pressures and exclusive identity (Hooghe et al. 2019:
chs. 6 & 8; Hooghe and Marks 2009: 12–14). This approach is rooted in com-
parative research on identity and domestic contestation, including Lipset and
Rokkan’s (1967) classic analysis of cleavages.3
Postfunctionalism assesses the causes and effects of politicization in three
steps. First, there is a mismatch between the institutional status quo and the
functional pressures for multilevel governance that arise from interdepen-
dence. European integration is here one aspect of a broader phenomenon,
the reconfiguration of the state to gain the benefits of providing public goods
at diverse scales from the local to the national and international level (Marks
2012).
The second step is concerned with the arena in which decision making
takes place. This can be insulated among government leaders, civil services,
European bodies, and interest groups or decision making may enter the
arena of mass politics where it is subject to mass media, political parties,
social movements, and government coalitions. This depends on the stakes
of the issue, and more importantly, on the capacity of contending actors to
politicize an issue that would, by default, be negotiated in a conventional
elite setting. Postfunctionalism pays detailed attention to the arena in
which an issue is debated because it affects the nature of conflict. Mass poli-
tics in elections, referendums, and party primaries opens the door to the
mobilization of national identity as a constraint on integration.
The third step analyzes how European integration shapes the structure of
political conflict. This draws on the behavioral literature on the strategic inter-
action of political parties, the dimensionality of party competition, and voter
choice.4 To the extent that European integration activates identity issues
related to the reconfiguration of the state, it disrupts established party
systems, gives rise to new radical left and radical nationalist parties, and con-
strains supranational problem solving. The systemic effect is to polarize
societies on a cultural divide that arguably takes the form of a durable
socio-political cleavage (Dalton 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018a; Kriesi et al.
2006). Among voters, research indicates that those with a more exclusive
attachment to the national ingroup are most prone to Euroskepticism and
to support nationalist parties.
The study of mass politics has its roots in political psychology and is distinct
from the rationalist-economic logic that underpins neofunctionalism and
intergovernmentalism. Public opinion scholars regard economic preferences
as just one possible motivation of human behavior, and one that is often
less powerful than religion, ethnicity, or communal identity. Hence the label
postfunctionalist, which is a term that stresses agnosticism about whether
decision making or its outcome will be characterized by functionality.
Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism conceive European inte-
gration as a cooperative process among interest groups and governments.
The effect of divergent preferences is to produce deadlock – that is, a
failure to shift the status quo, reap collective gains, or transcend the lowest
common denominator. Postfunctionalism, by contrast, conceives European
integration as a conflictual process arising from incompatible belief
systems. It is a form of jurisdictional restructuring that, like the development
of the national state, has produced a profound cultural divide. Hence the
range of possible outcomes under postfunctionalism encompasses not only
the status quo or its punctuated reform, but also disintegration.5
Each approach can be distinguished quite sharply from the other two. Cor-
respondingly, as we next suggest, each school interprets the landmark events
in the course of European (dis)integration in the light of its basic premises.6
The Eurocrisis
The Eurocrisis was triggered by the meltdown of confidence in the U.S.
financial sector following the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 and is
exogenous to all three approaches. However, scholars in each approach
have had much to say about its effects in Europe. The Eurocrisis is, at one
and the same time, a case of iterated intergovernmental bargaining, a crisis
that has extended regional integration, and an example of the constraining
effects of politicization.
Several features of the crisis are amenable to an intergovernmentalist
account. In the first place, it was a crisis in the full sense of the term – an
event of intense danger that required an extraordinary response. The very
notion of a crisis suggests that ordinary procedures are insufficient and that
the initiative lies chiefly with the member governments themselves. In this
case, the contrast between normal EU policy making and the abnormal
response to the Eurocrisis could hardly be sharper. The European Union
was utterly unprepared for an existential threat to the Eurozone. Its
financial resources were small, and Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty
denied the EU an insurance role of last resort. If the Eurozone were to
survive, this would have had to come about as a result of intergovernmental
bargaining.
The crisis hit Europe as a financial shock handled independently by
national governments. However, it soon became clear that massive imbal-
ances in the Eurozone threatened to bankrupt Greece with potentially disas-
trous consequences for the Eurozone. What then ensued was a lengthy
process of intergovernmental negotiation characterized by 1) heavy interde-
pendence, which induced Eurozone governments to coordinate, and 2) sharp
asymmetries, which placed Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and above all Greece, in
the position of dire supplicants for financial support and insurance (Schimmel-
fennig 2015: 182, 185). The iterated negotiation from October 2008 to 2012
was dominated by national governments, which were calculating the conse-
quences of their actions in Euros. The result was a series of lowest-common
denominator deals constrained by divergent preferences on the distribution
of adjustment costs. This did just enough to avert the break-up of the Euro-
zone while minimizing the short-term pecuniary cost for the Northern
states in the dominant bargaining position (Biermann et al. 2019: 252).
Intergovernmentalism explains the particular bargaining outcomes as dis-
crete episodes, whereas neofunctionalism connects them in a longer-term
perspective (Jones et al. 2016: 1027). The severity of the crisis in the Eurozone
was an unintended consequence of economic and monetary integration, for-
malized in the Maastricht Treaty, which was itself the outcome of the deepen-
ing of the single market in the 1980s. However, monetary union was half-
baked because it eliminated monetary flexibility at the national level but
made no provision for fiscal insurance to respond to an asymmetric shock.
When the crisis hit, path dependency set Eurocrisis management on course
for saving rather than ditching the Euro, and this generated intense pressure
to fix its flaws. At first, intergovernmental negotiation produced institutions
controlled exclusively by member states operating outside the EU. In the fol-
lowing years, intergovernmental fixes were nudged closer to the community
method empowering the European Commission and European Parliament. In
2012, ECB president Draghi promised ‘to do whatever it takes’ to preserve the
Euro, including the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions and, from
2015, quantitative easing. Hence, the unintended consequence of monetary
union was to intensify a financial crisis that led member states to integrate
in ways they had previously rejected. In short, the crisis arose as an unin-
tended spillover and concluded with enhanced supranationalism.7
Postfunctionalism roots the response to the Eurocrisis in domestic politics,
and in particular, in the rise of nationalist opposition to European integration
that petrified governments even as the economic costs of inactivity rose
(Hooghe and Marks 2018a: 109). The result was a spiral of crisis and
inadequate response.
Intense functional pressure for EU coordination met rising resistance to
supranational solutions as the crisis became salient in domestic politics.
Radical-nationalist parties, egged on by the tabloid media, framed the crisis
as a contest among nations and a fight against Brussels. Northern govern-
ments were reluctant to follow the advice of the World Bank, the IMF, and
the Obama administration to rebalance trade by increasing domestic con-
sumption and ditching their ‘me-first’ policy of export-led growth. These gov-
ernments were acting, as postfunctionalism expects, as party coalitions that
were acutely aware of public opinion (Jacoby 2015: 9–10; Schmidt 2014:
199). This brought the Eurozone close to collapse.
Politicization in the shadow of exclusive national identity decisively nar-
rowed options for reform. With fiscal union off the table, the chief response
was to depoliticize by framing the Eurocrisis as a regulatory issue handled
by non-majoritarian institutions.8 The eventual cocktail of ECB measures, bail-
outs, heightened macro-economic surveillance, and banking supervision was
partial, delayed, and Pareto-inferior. Politicized procrastination carried a high
price tag for the North as for the South. A postfunctionalist analysis does not
downplay functional pressures, though it seeks to explain why policies that
are functionally rational may not be politically feasible (Laffan 2016: 929).
The permissive consensus that once facilitated elite problem solving seems
broken. Mainstream parties have been losing ground in elections since the
1980s and particularly since the Eurocrisis. European integration is trapped in
a cultural cleavage that has reconfigured political conflict. This affects parties
across the ideological spectrum, energizing nationalist parties and radical left
parties, draining support from Christian democratic parties, and blindsiding
social democratic parties that were in power in the early years of the
Eurocrisis.
Neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and postfunctionalism ask
different questions and focus on different mechanisms. Neofunctionalism
grasps the puzzle of supranational reform in the face of crisis. It explains
how the great recession generated unanticipated problems that led to
enhanced macro-economic coordination, banking union, and an extended
role for the ECB. Intergovernmentalism focuses on divergent national prefer-
ences and the ensuing negotiations that produced a series of partial deals.
Postfunctionalism suggests that the response to the Eurocrisis was con-
strained because it activated a fault line in domestic politics that pitted pro-
ponents of European solutions against defenders of national solidarity.
From this perspective, these theories are not mutually exclusive but can
serve as complementary explanations for the European Union’s response to
the Eurocrisis.
The migration crisis
An estimated 2.7 million immigrants arrived in EU-28 in 2015, of whom around
half sought asylum. Spurred by civil war in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and instability in
several African countries, the number of asylum-seekers rose from 260,000 in
2010 to 627,000 in 2014 and spiked at 1.3 million in 2015 and 2016.
Immigration is a national competence for all EU members, though the
Schengen area has a shared regime for asylum seekers, the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System, known as the Dublin system. This requires asylum
seekers to process their application in the first country they enter. The
Dublin system was not designed to absorb large numbers, and it was
pushed over the brink when Italy and Greece abandoned vetting people in
the summer of 2015 and let them journey north. The crisis unfolded in
August 2015 when the German government formally suspended the Dublin
regulation for Syrian refugees in order to admit them directly, and then par-
tially reversed course three weeks later by temporarily reinstating border con-
trols with Austria. These events set off a chain reaction of unilateral moves in
which Schengen member states closed borders, turned back asylum-seekers,
and refused to implement a relocation scheme for 160,000 refugees that they
had legally committed to.
The conspicuous display of unilateralism is consistent with an intergovern-
mentalist account in which a subset of states was determined not to compro-
mise. In contrast to the Eurocrisis, which was widely seen as an existential
threat to the Eurozone, the migration crisis produced weak pressure for
cooperation. Whereas transnational finance was instrumental in pressing for
deeper integration to save the Euro, in the migration crisis, human rights
groups were the only consistent humanitarian voice and they were
drowned out by unilateralism. Moreover, the economic cost of non-agree-
ment in the migration crisis is modest. Even a wholesale suspension of Schen-
gen would not upend economic growth. The states least affected by
migratory pressures could stonewall pleas for accepting refugees without
fearing that their defection would come back to bite if others followed suit.
From a game-theoretic perspective, the least affected states had a dominant
strategy that was independent of the response they expected from frontline
states. The outcome is consistent with intergovernmentalism: a lowest
common denominator in which defectors get their cake and eat it by blocking
reform that would impose a common framework while refusing responsibility
for incoming refugees (Biermann et al. 2019: 258–60).
While intergovernmentalism is pertinent to headline bargaining on refugee
quotas, neofunctionalism’s wider lens helps to explain why, beyond the lime-
light, there has been an incremental, albeit haphazard, increase in suprana-
tional activity. A neofunctionalist analysis looks for a) dysfunctionalities in
the status quo that can trigger a crisis following an exogenous shock; b)
sunk costs that stack the deck against disintegration; and c) supranational
and transnational actors offering deeper integration to fix dysfunctionality.
The Dublin regime, an unintended spillover from Schengen which abol-
ished passport controls at internal borders, was dysfunctional. Induced to
coordinate but reluctant to give up sovereignty over a core state power,
member states settled on a minimalist system characterized by ‘low harmoni-
zation, weak monitoring, low solidarity and lack of strong institutions’ (Sci-
pioni 2018: 1365). This could hobble along only if the flow of asylum
seekers was small and dispersed. The refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016 violated
both assumptions.
Why did member states not decide to fold this dysfunctional system? Neo-
functionalism highlights the path-dependent constraints on disintegration
stemming from the costs of policy adjustment after three decades of Schen-
gen coordination, the costs of delay at resurrected borders at a time of econ-
omic recovery, and perhaps most importantly, symbolic defeat if ditching a
popular institution and key pillar of European integration – free movement
of people (Niemann and Speyer 2018: 31). For each of these reasons, political
leaders were deeply reluctant to dismantle Schengen.
Supranational actors took the initiative in proposing reform. In May 2015,
the European Commission’s European Agenda on Migration outlined immedi-
ate steps to tackle the crisis along with medium-term reform of the Dublin
system. The Commission’s plan for refugee relocation was rejected, but
supranational cooperation was upgraded for processing immigrants and
monitoring borders.9
Postfunctionalism puts the spotlight on identity politics. The migration
crisis touched a nerve of national identity because it asked Europe’s popu-
lations to harbor culturally dissimilar people (Börzel and Risse 2018: 15, 17–
18). And was this a matter for Europe or for national governments to
decide? By the Fall of 2015, immigration became the number one issue in
most EU member states and rising support for nationalist parties made it
vastly more difficult for national governments to craft compromise deals at
the European level.
The migration crisis intensified a long-simmering transnational divide
arising from the perforation of national states by immigration, integration,
and trade. This divide has taken the form of a social cleavage that is arguably
structuring political conflict on a generational time scale.10 It became the lens
through which the challenge of helping millions of refugees from war-torn
Syria and Iraq was interpreted.
The resulting politicization narrowed the options for mainstream parties
seeking an EU-wide response to the flow of refugees. Nationalist challengers
across Europe impelled governments to introduce restrictions, not only in the
Visegrad countries but also in Germany, Austria, and Sweden where the public
response was initially positive. By early 2016, electoral pressure to shut the
door appeared irresistible. In March, when its popularity was in freefall, the
Merkel government adopted a restrictive asylum law (Asylpaket II) and nego-
tiated a deal to hold migrants in Turkey. The Austrian SPÖ/ÖVP government
changed course to impose annual caps and began construction of a fence
on the border with Slovenia. In Sweden, the social democratic government,
supported by the moderate right, re-imposed border controls and reduced
welfare support for refugees.
Neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and postfunctionalism illumi-
nate different sides of the migration crisis. Intergovernmentalism explains
why an interstate deal to share responsibility for refugees was a non-starter.
Neofunctionalism reveals the surprising ability of supranational actors to
engineer incremental steps towards a more supranational Schengen. Post-
functionalism shows how the migration crisis has intensified a cultural
divide across Europe that pits proponents of a multicultural, open, Europe
against its opponents. Across East and West Europe, the crisis has been a
major factor contributing to the electoral success of nationalist parties.
Brexit
The causes of Brexit lie within, rather than beyond, Europe. The puzzle con-
fronting theorists of European integration encompasses the origins, as well
as the course and consequences, of this landmark event.
Intergovernmentalism has engaged Brexit on two fronts. The first has been
to challenge the claim that Brexit will have a substantive effect either on the
UK or on the EU as a whole. The view that Brexit is epiphenomenal is logically
consistent with two core premises of intergovernmentalism: first, that the
course of European integration depends on the benefits of cooperation
mediated by intergovernmental bargaining; and second, that intergovern-
mental bargains depend not on referendum outcomes but on economic inter-
ests, relative power, and credible commitments. On both grounds, Brexit can
and has been regarded as an ‘illusory’ (Moravcsik 2016) event that has impli-
cations for UK domestic politics but not for the association of the UK with the
European Union.
This line of argument is buttressed by analysis of the power-politics of post-
referendum negotiations. The functional benefits of economic integration –
recognized by all three approaches – give both the UK and the EU a
common interest in maintaining UK membership of the single market in
goods and services. However, the Brexit negotiations are a lesson in asymme-
try. It is one thing for a member state to use its leverage under unanimity
voting to gain an opt-out from a proposed reform, but quite another to
gain an opt-out from the rules governing exit. An opt-in requires the assent
of all remaining member states along with the European Parliament. The
UK is, in any case, a weak supplicant with a lot to lose while the EU is in the
driver’s seat with much less to lose. The expected result is that the UK
seeks to remain part of the single market, but symbolically preserves its sover-
eignty by formally divorcing itself from the EU.
Neofunctionalism places great emphasis on the economic interdependen-
cies that sustain pressure for integration. In 2016, 43.4% of UK exports went to
the EU, and 53.3% of imports came from the EU. The threat of economic dis-
ruption serves as a mighty disincentive for a hard Brexit. Beyond this, neofunc-
tionalism highlights the cost of an exit that ruptures decades-long EU rule
making and adjudication. This has induced the UK government to make a des-
perate plea for a transition period after March 2019, most recently set at
twenty-one months, to allow the country to set up its own regulatory machin-
ery. However, there are neofunctionalist grounds to expect that the UK will be
extensively subject to EU rules and European Court of Justice rulings for the
foreseeable future.
A postfunctionalist account provides a window on the decision to hold a
referendum, on the referendum debate itself, and on the tensions in the Con-
servative party that shaped the UK’s subsequent bargaining strategy – or the
absence of one. More generally, the Brexit referendum illustrates a tension
between functional pressures for integration and nationalist resistance that
is part of a wider divide across Europe.
Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum following
the general election of 2015 was a calculated effort to stem the rise of UKIP
and suppress a growing EU rejectionist faction within his governing Conser-
vative party (Jensen and Snaith 2016: 1308). This worked. The Independence
party was removed as an electoral threat, and the rejectionist wing of the
party held their fire in order to campaign for the Conservative parliamentary
majority that was necessary to deliver Cameron’s promise. For Cameron
himself this was a Mephistophelean pact: the referendum would take
place only if he beat the odds by forming a single-party Conservative gov-
ernment, and he was convinced that victory in the election would be fol-
lowed by victory in the referendum. He was wrong. Postfunctionalist
analyses of the role of national identity in mass settings were confirmed.
The two sides of the public debate never connected. Remainers predicted
economic dislocation while avoiding any mention of European identity.
Leavers emphasized national self-determination while sidestepping econ-
omics by promising increased funding for the National Health Service and
trade with Commonwealth countries (Gamble 2018: 1216). The decisive
issue was immigration, and this became joined at the hip with opposition
to EU membership (Dennison and Geddes 2018: 1145; Hobolt 2016: 1271;
Hooghe and Marks 2018a: 109). Opinion research since the referendum
finds hardening polarization on the Remain/Leave divide (Hobolt et al.
2018).
Few events reveal so clearly the disruptive effect of a referendum in a
climate of politicization. Far from resolving tensions in the Conservative
party, the referendum exacerbated them. The vote provided just a single
bit of information. It presented voters with the simplest possible choice
on a profoundly complex issue. A dichotomous choice says nothing about
the trade-offs, the compromises needed to realize them, or the likely conse-
quences. Postfunctionalist accounts perceive the functional pressures on the
UK government arising from asymmetric economic interdependence, but
they do not conclude that these produce an economically rational
outcome. Nationalism can, and sometimes does, subvert multilevel
governance.
Postfunctionalism has the greatest leverage in explaining the origins,
course, and effects of the UK referendum on EU membership. It provides
a nuanced understanding of the rise of national identity, the clash
between nationalism and international governance, and the effects on EU
politics. However, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism each have
something to offer by stressing how economic interdependence weakens
the case for a hard Brexit. Liberal intergovernmentalism goes further to
suggest that Brexit is epiphenomenal, a claim that is inconsistent with neo-
functionalist emphasis on sunk costs and postfunctionalist analysis of politi-
cal conflict.
The illiberal challenge
The illiberal challenge to the independence of the judiciary, separation of
powers, and protection of basic liberties in Hungary and Poland is perhaps
the greatest contemporary challenge to the legitimacy of the European
Union. Writers in each school have sought to explain the EU’s response and
the extent to which it has been effective.
The strategic context of illiberalism is one of weak economic interdepen-
dence. Events in Hungary and Poland undermine the core values of the Euro-
pean Union, but they do not pose an economic threat. Governments of both
countries have been careful to comply with the rules of the single market
while backsliding on liberal democracy.
An intergovernmentalist perspective highlights the difficulty of imposing
sanctions on Poland and Hungary using Article 7 of the Treaty on European
Union. Because these governments are prepared to veto sanctions on each
other, the European Council is stymied by the unanimity minus one threshold
for determining that there has been a breach of the EU’s core values.11 The
problem goes back to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) which, in the lead-
up to Eastern enlargement, established a concern with the content of dom-
estic law, but preserved for member states the exclusive right to make the
final decision about sanctions. So while Article 7 punctures national sover-
eignty by extending the remit of the EU to domestic law, it sustains national
sovereignty by making sanctions conditional on a positive vote from all
member states except the offending member state.
Beyond the unanimity restriction of Article 7 lies a more fundamental
problem. Because Article 7 deals with domestic, not European, legislation, it
is not reinforced by secondary legislation that would allow the Commission
or the European Court of Justice to pin down contravention of the EU’s
core democratic principles. Importantly, Article 51(2) of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights limits the application of the Charter to national decisions that
implement EU law.12 Both the threshold of unanimity and the absence of sec-
ondary legislation reveal the reluctance of national governments to allow
supranational bodies to intervene in domestic constitutional reform.
Neofunctionalism, by contrast, alerts one to the supranational activism of
the Commission and the European Court of Justice. The Commission has
used the three-stage process added to Article 7 in the Nice Treaty to make
assessments of democratic backsliding, followed by recommendations and
dialogue (Sedelmeier 2017: 345–46). In December 2017, it opened Article 7
proceedings against Poland when the government tried to stack the High
Court by cutting the retirement age for judges and allowing the minister of
justice to fire judges at will. Initially, the PiS government seemed to backtrack,
but its amendments to the law were mostly cosmetic. In September 2018, the
Commission asked the European Court of Justice to suspend the Polish law,
which the Court did in October. In November 2018, the Polish government
complied by reversing the law and reinstating the judges it had fired.
The Commission has also been seeking ways to exert pressure on illiberal
states by means other than Article 7. There are several avenues. For example,
the Commission used its competition powers to block the Fidesz government
from penalizing independent television companies with an advertisement tax
(Blauberger and Kelemen 2017: 326). In April 2018, the Commission sought to
give some safeguards to journalists in illiberal societies by proposing a whis-
tleblower directive that would require member states to have a framework
protecting individuals who report a threat to the public interest. In May
2018, the Commission presented its draft multi-annual financial framework
for 2021–2027, which includes around a billion Euros for a ‘Justice, Rights
and Values Fund’ to fund groups defending democratic rights. The Commis-
sion’s proposal links access to cohesion and agricultural funding to the rule
of law and judicial independence. Under the proposed rules, a Commission
decision to cut off aid to a violating member state could be overturned
only by qualified majority in the Council.
The European Court of Justice is now hearing cases with major implications
for illiberal governments. In a judgment that temporary salary cuts for judges
in Portugal do not compromise the rule of law, the court established a general
obligation for member states to guarantee the independence of courts. The
principle is simple and compelling. National courts are an intrinsic part of a
European system of authoritative adjudication, hence ‘the guarantee of inde-
pendence, which is inherent in the task of adjudication… is required not only
at EU level… but also at the level of the Member States as regards national
courts’ (Case C-64/16: 42).13 This punctures PiS’ claim that its judicial
reforms are not subject to EU jurisdiction. A path has been opened for bring-
ing cases regarding the independence of domestic courts before the ECJ.
In July 2018, the ECJ issued a preliminary ruling that a judge should not
implement a European arrest warrant to another EU member state if they
have reason to believe that this state’s judicial system is compromised and
if the extradited person would not face a fair trial.14 The referral was made
by a High Court judge in Ireland who refused a warrant to extradite a Polish
citizen on the grounds that the Polish government had undermined the inde-
pendence of its court system. In its ruling, the ECJ not only upholds the court’s
right to query an EU member state’s justice system and block extradition, but
also lays down criteria for assessing judicial independence. The implications
could reach into other areas of judicial reciprocity, including contracts,
taxes, and family law. As The Economist points out, ‘Judges in Europe often
have been able to get to the parts that governments cannot reach’ (X 2018).
So, EU pressure on Hungary and Poland has ratcheted up despite the
failure to impose intergovernmental sanctions. The Commission and the ECJ
have developed new channels of influence. Will illiberalism become an
impetus for supranationalism?
A postfunctionalist account probes the sources of illiberalism and helps
explain why the governments of Hungary and Poland have, so far, been
able to resist EU pressure and even utilize it to sustain their own support.
Under what circumstances can the EU affect the agenda of the Fidesz and
PiS governments? The answer hangs on how EU actions are perceived in
the target country, the strength of political opposition, and the vulnerability
of an illiberal government to domestic pressure.
Illiberalism is allied to a nationalist discourse of parochialism, conservativism,
and anti-elitism which is mobilized against the perceived threat of foreigners,
multinationals, and the European Union. Political parties in Hungary, and
more recently Poland, take more polarized stances on the GALTAN dimension
of political contestation than on the economic left-right dimension.15
Fidesz and Law & Justice have mobilized nativists against a multilevel and
multicultural Europe. This has gone furthest in Hungary, where, following
Fidesz’ defeat in the 2002 election, Victor Orbán put himself at the head of
a grassroots movement of 16,000 Civic Circles organizing anti-government
demonstrations, rallies, petitions, strikes, and blockades invoking Hungarian
national community.16 This provides Fidesz with a powerful organizational
base to ramp up its nationalist message and neutralize right-wing competi-
tors. When Fidesz came to power in 2010, it manipulated electoral rules, ger-
rymandered districts, and centralized the party’s hold over key institutions,
including the media. Its policies have affected the liberal elements of democ-
racy – the rule of law, press freedom, and freedom of association. This has
crystallized a sharp polarization in which associations of every kind, including
‘dog-keepers, bird-watchers, fishing anglers… voice right-wing or left-wing
political views’ (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2010: 165). The electoral success of this
strategy – magnified by a disproportional electoral system and a divided
opposition – has made it difficult for opponents to contest the new status
quo. Hungary’s foreign minister Szijjártó recently told the European parlia-
ment ‘The Hungarian people appear on the Hungarian election’s name rolls,
while you don’t’ (Bayer and de la Baume 2018).
Until recently, illiberalism in Hungary and Poland was tolerated in the place
where one might expect it to be most vulnerable – the European Parliament.
The allies of Fidesz in the European People’s Party (EPP), in particular the CDU/
CSU, have resisted the call to expel Fidesz because doing so would cost seats.
However, in September 2018, the European Parliament voted to issue a formal
warning toHungaryunderArticle 7 afterManfredWeber, chair of the EPPandcon-
tender for the presidency of the Commission, announced he would vote in favor.
Fidesz has sought to deflect criticism of illiberalism by appealing to
national sovereignty and Christian values. When in early 2018 Bavarian CSU
leader Horst Seehofer was asked whether the rule of law was respected in
Hungary, he replied that ‘Orbán stands on a foundation of the rule of law’,
while noting that Orbán is the democratically elected prime minister of an
EU member state (SHZ 5 Jan 2018). After Orbán’s electoral victory in April
2018, Seehofer warned the European Union not to conduct a ‘politics of arro-
gance and prejudice’ and stressed that ‘nothing is a stronger confirmation
than success at the ballot box’ (Handelsblatt 5 Jan 2018).
The divide is two-sided, and there are signs of mobilization on the cosmo-
politan side. In his acceptance speech for the Charlemagne prize on 9 May
2018, French president Emmanuel Macron referred to Hungary and Poland
by name when he warned against ‘the temptation to abandon the very foun-
dations of our democracies and our rule of law.’17 In June 2018, the European
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs called for
sanctions against the Hungarian government on the grounds that it violated
judicial independence, freedom of expression, and the rights of refugee,
Roma, and Jewish minorities. Citing a ‘serious breach of European values’ a
two-thirds majority in the European Parliament voted to trigger Article 7.
Under what circumstances can the EU confront illiberalism? Intergovern-
mentalism explains the difficulty of imposing sanctions via Article 7 under
current rules. Neofunctionalism directs attention to non-state actors, particu-
larly the Commission and the ECJ. Postfunctionalism probes the domestic
sources of illiberalism and suggests that transnational actors can make the
greatest difference when they can leverage domestic opposition. These
insights are not mutually exclusive, and neither, perhaps, are the approaches
that suggest them.
Conclusion
Neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and postfunctionalism advance our
understanding of the crises that have shaped the EU over the past decade.
The premise of this article is that none of these theories is fundamentally
wrongheaded or subject to sweeping disconfirmation. Each provides a line
of sight into European integration. However, they do so from contrasting per-
spectives, using different bodies of evidence to shed light on distinct puzzles.
Each theory disciplines thinking about the behavior of key actors, the arenas
in which they act, and the causal mechanisms that connect their actions to
institutional outcomes. Instead of asking which theory is best, we compare
the contributions of each theory in explaining multi-faceted events. At one
and the same time, the Eurocrisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and illiberalism
can be viewed as episodes of intergovernmental bargaining, path-dependent
spillovers, and ideological conflict. Neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism,
and postfunctionalism, alongside the wide variety of other theories that
have been applied to the EU, can and should be mined for conflicting hypoth-
eses that can be systematically tested against each other. However, prior to
this, it can be illuminating to engage a theory in its own terms, and to probe its
use value in explaining phenomena for which it was not designed, but which
are in its field of vision.
Notes
1. Research was funded by the Kenan and Burton Craige research funds at UNC
Chapel Hill, and a Robert Schuman Fellowship at the EUI, Florence. A draft
was presented at a conference on ‘Grand Theories of European Integration in
the Twenty-first Century’ at the EUI, 31 May–1 June 2018. We are grateful for
comments by participants at this conference, with special thanks to Philipp Gen-
schel and to three anonymous reviewers of this Journal.
2. Pierson 1996. Early neofunctionalism theorized path dependence implicitly
(Haas 1958/2004: 527; Schmitter 1969).
3. See Bartolini 2005; Deutsch 1966; De Wilde et al. 2016; Diez-Medrano 2003;
Evans 1999; Grande and Kriesi 2016; Hix 1999, 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006; McNamara
2018; Risse 2010, 2015; Rokkan 1970; Teney et al. 2014.
4. See e.g., De Vries 2018; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Hutter et al. 2016; Hutter and
Kriesi 2018; Rovny 2015; Van Elsas et al. 2016.
5. Disintegration is theorized as a potential outcome by Hodson and Puetter 2019;
Jones 2018; Vollaard 2014; Webber 2019.
6. Hooghe and Marks 2018b is a more extensive analysis.
7. See Bauer and Becker 2014; Börzel and Risse 2018; Saurugger 2016; Schimmel-
fennig 2018.
8. Kleider and Stoeckel (2019) and Stoeckel and Kuhn (2018) reveal the limited
appetite for European solidarity among public opinion. Börzel (2016: 10, 14),
Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018), and Grande and Kriesi (2016: 290–2) evaluate
the scope for depoliticization. For a general argument about the use of non-
majoritarianism see Bickerton et al. 2015.
9. Frontex now has competence for border control, coordination with national
coastal guards, and rescue missions. On supranationalism in migration policy
see Börzel and Risse 2018; Niemann and Speyer 2018; Niemann and Zaun
2018; Schimmelfennig 2018; Scipioni 2018.
10. Hooghe and Marks 2018a: 115–116; also De Vries 2018; Hutter and Kriesi 2018;
Marks et al. 2018.
11. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Unanimity does not apply to the first
stage of Article 7, where a four-fifths majority in the Council and two-thirds in the
Parliament may issue a formal warning to a state suspected of violating funda-
mental rights.
12. This appears to be the legal consensus. See Spaventa (2016: 11); also Blauberger
and Kelemen (2017: note 12).
13. ECJ 27 February 2018 judgment in the case of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Por-
tugueses (Case C-64/16).
14. ECJ 25 July 2018 judgment in the case of Minister for Justice and Equality v LM
(Case C- 216/18 PPU).
15. In Hungary, the vote-weighted standard deviation among political parties on
GALTAN, averaged over 2002–2017, is 2.6 against 1.2 on the economic left-
right (both 11-point scales). In Poland, it is 2.9 against 2.1 (Polk et al. 2017).
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